Global carbon surcharge for the reduction of anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide by Thess, André et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Global carbon surcharge for the reduction
of anthropogenic emission of carbon
dioxide
André Thess1,2* , Martin Klein1, Kristina Nienhaus1 and Thomas Pregger1
Abstract
Background: Many governments take the view that voluntary national targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
are sufficient to avoid negative climate effects. In the absence of independent verification, however, pledges are
unlikely to be sufficient for a rapid and strong reduction of emissions. It is often claimed that a global carbon tax
could be an effective instrument. However, such a tax is difficult to set and to collect, especially in countries with
poor administrative infrastructure.
Results: Here, we formulate and discuss a novel approach, the Global Carbon Surcharge (GCS), that mimics a
carbon tax but does not require tax collection by governments. We define GCS as a requirement or a voluntary
commitment encompassing all companies extracting carbon-carrying raw materials, namely coal, oil, gas and
limestone, with the aim to burden their extraction with costs proportional to their carbon intensity. GCS mandates
all companies to store these materials immediately after mining for a given period of time in the vicinity of the
production site. Thereby, GCS generates additional costs that propagate through all sectors of the global economy.
We elucidate how the investment costs for the storage infrastructure translate into surcharges on the raw materials.
Conclusions: We show that by a proper choice of the storage time and the size of the storage unit, GCS becomes
equivalent to a carbon tax in the range between 50 and 100 € per ton of CO2 that is assumed to be necessary for
the transition to a carbon-neutral energy system. An attractive feature of GCS is that it can be verified, in particular
by citizens themselves, using publicly available satellite data. Finally, if compulsory storage is coupled to blockchain-
based smart contracts and a mandatory (expensive) mining of cryptocurrency, GCS can be operated without governmental
protectionism, corruption and fraud. However, the main uncertainties of the GCS approach lie in the substantial expansion of
infrastructure and the fact that the induced price effects must be sufficient to achieve a rapid and far-reaching substitution of
fossil fuels.
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Background
Mitigating climate change is a grand challenge of the twenty-
first century [1–7]. The current approach to accomplish this
task is embodied in the Paris Agreement [1] under which
each country sets voluntary national targets for the reduction
of the emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHG).
However, such agreements alone have drawbacks. If there
are no financial penalties against countries who fail to meet
their targets, the implemented agreements can be ineffective.
Furthermore, governments can withdraw from the Paris
Agreement, as the announcement by the US administration
[8, 9] has shown. Finally, there is no explicit incentive for
governments to meet the targets in a cost-efficient way.
Market-based instruments such as carbon trading
schemes and carbon taxes [3, 10, 11] promote an efficient
allocation of resources and lead to economic incentives
for decarbonization. However, carbon trading does not
necessarily cover all sectors and requires extensive admin-
istrative efforts for small and decentralized sources of
GHG emissions. Carbon taxes do not necessarily cover all
sectors either. Moreover, they are difficult to collect in
countries with weak governance, and the use of the tax
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income in such countries is not necessarily to the benefit
of the people.
Current approaches, in which international climate agree-
ments are essentially voluntary, have little prospect of slow-
ing climate change if freeriding is widespread. To avoid free
riders that occur when a party receives the benefits of a pub-
lic good without sharing the costs, other researchers have
already developed polycentric CO2 surcharge systems that
do not rely on international global agreements that need to
be transposed into national law.
Spreng et al. [12] propose a new type of climate insur-
ance for CO2. In this system, fossil fuels can be ‘insured’.
A label would then indicate whether products were pro-
duced with energy from insured fossil fuels or not. The
premiums collected from this ‘risk pool’ would be used
to adapt to climate change and to compensate for cer-
tain damages; in return, the producers of the insured
fossil fuels would be protected against claims of liability
for climate damage. Consumers could decide whether
they prefer labelled or unlabelled products. Similarly,
Nordhaus [13] argues for a so-called climate club, a new
type of free-trade zone. Participating governments would
be incentivized to pursue a strong climate policy as this
would not lead to exclusion from the free-trade zone.
Modelling results suggest that small trade penalties for
non-participants can lead to more climate cooperation.
However, it is difficult for such and other approaches to
prove their effectiveness.
To overcome the drawbacks of existing schemes for
the reduction of CO2 emissions, we formulate a concep-
tually simple economic model, the Global Carbon Sur-
charge (GCS), that increases the costs of carbon-carrying
materials at the earliest possible stage of the value chain.
It thereby creates economic incentives to decarbonize
the energy systems and minimizes administrative efforts.
In the present work, we investigate GCS as an exemplary
thought experiment, without being able to go into the
details of its practical implementation in a comprehen-
sive manner. In particular, we are aware that the sole
purpose of our concept is raising the cost of CO2 emis-
sions and that it is therefore unlikely to be realized in its
proposed form.
Approach
The majority of anthropogenic CO2 emission is due to
the combustion of coal, oil and gas, and to a smaller ex-
tent due to the use of limestone (calcium carbonate,
CaCO3) for the production of cement [14]. If a mechan-
ism could render the extraction of these materials
increasingly difficult, the prices for these four commod-
ities would increase. Such economic signal would propa-
gate through the global value chain and provide strong
incentives for a decarbonization of the energy system.
We stipulate that the commodity x (where x stands for
gas, oil, coal or limestone) is stored for a given period of
time, denoted nx [years], in the vicinity of the mining
site, before it is released into the market. We further as-
sume that the investment costs for the storage infra-
structure are equal to cx [in € per ton of storage
capacity], the lifetime of the infrastructure is n [years]
and the interest rate is i [percent], and that the operating
costs for the infrastructure are negligible in comparison
with the investment costs.
As detailed in the ‘Methods: model and data’ section,
we compute the surcharge csx [in € per ton of CO2] that
has to be added to the cost of each of the four materials
in order to compensate for the depreciation of the stor-
age infrastructure. This quantity shall be referred to as
the Global Carbon Surcharge. We are particularly inter-
ested in the question under which conditions the GCS is
equal to 75 €/t [€ per ton of CO2] assumed here to be a
plausible benchmark of effectiveness in the wide range
of estimates of social costs of CO2 emission [15, 16]. In
order to show the sensitivity of the results, we distin-
guish between more expensive small-scale and lower-
cost large-scale options and vary interest rate, storage
time and lifetime of the storage infrastructure.
It should be made clear from the outset that the sole
purpose of this measure is to make CO2 emissions more
expensive without any other benefit. This distinguishes
the present thought experiment from other concepts like
the carbon tax.
Methods: model and data
Model
Our model for the carbon surcharge csx rests on the fol-
lowing assumptions: (1) A source of a carbon-carrying
raw material x (coal, oil, gas, limestone) delivers a mass
mx [tons] per year. After combustion of gas, oil and coal
or after calcination of limestone, a mass of m [tons] CO2
is generated from each ton of raw material. For the
present computation, we do not need the masses mx and
m but only the carbon ratio αx = m/mx. This parameter
expresses how many tons of CO2 are generated from
each ton of carbon-carrying material. (2) The raw mate-
rials are stored in a storage infrastructure with specific
investment costs cx [Euro per ton], lifetime n [years] and
interest rate i [percent] whose operating costs are negli-
gible in comparison with the investment costs. (3) A
mandatory storage time nx [years] is assumed over which
the raw material x has to be kept in the storage infra-
structure before it may be released for sale.
Under the given assumptions, the total capital cost of
the storage infrastructure (per ton of storage capacity)
can be calculated as cxan,i, where the annuity an,i is given
by the equation
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an;i ¼ 1þ ið Þ
n  i
1þ ið Þn−1 ð1Þ
The depreciation of the infrastructure appears as a
surcharge to each ton of material for each storage cycle.
The total number of storage cycles over the lifetime of
the infrastructure is n/(tx/365) or n/nx. Taking into ac-
count that one ton of material x is converted into αx
tons of CO2, the desired result for the carbon surcharge
is
csx ¼ nxcxan;iαx ð2Þ
This quantity is equivalent to the effective carbon sur-
charge in € per ton of CO2 that would be induced by the
proposed mechanism.
General input data
For our calculations, we use the following general input
data: αgas = 2.98, αoil = 3.21, αcoal = 2.5, αlimestone = 0.44
(according to [17]), an assumed lifetime of the storage
infrastructure of n = 10 years and interest rates equal to
i = 0%, 5% and 10%.
Data for large-scale storage infrastructure
Natural large-scale storage solutions include all options
where natural materials are used to confine the mined ma-
terial. We use the following estimates for the specific in-
vestment costs cx based on expert judgments, available
analyses (e.g., [18, 19]) and own assumptions:
○ Open-pit coal or limestone storage: cc = 1 €/t
○ Underground oil storage: co = 1.1 €/t
○ Underground gas storage salt cavern: cg = 5 €/t to
35 €/t
Fig. 1 Carbon surcharge for large-scale storage depending on lifetime and storage time
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○ Underground gas storage depleted gas reservoir:
cg = 1 €/t to 18 €/t
Artificial large-scale storage solutions include all op-
tions where the storage vessels are made of artificial ma-
terials. Our estimations are based on various industry
expert interviews, business information (e.g., [20–22])
and own assumptions and amount to:
○ Enclosed coal and limestone bunkers: cc = 200 €/t
○ Oil storage tanks (steel tanks): co = 300 €/t
○ Gas tank farms (pipe container, 70 bar): cg = 550 €/t
Data for small-scale storage infrastructure
The investment costs consist of investment in the wagon
(approximately 100,000 €, estimation based on informa-
tion from German manufacturers [23–25]), in the tracks
(around 10,000 € per 10m trackage derived from historic
cost data for light railways) and the cost of steel containers
that depends on the good (again average estimations de-
rived from manufacturer’s information [26, 27] and own
assumptions):
○ Silo for pulverized coal and limestone: cc = 2200 €/t
○ Oil tank: co = 1900 €/t
○ Gas tank (CNG, 200 bar): cg = 8900 €/t
Sensitivity tests were carried out with regard to storage
time and lifetime of the storage infrastructure. The re-
sults of these calculations in terms of effective GCS are
plotted in Figs. 1 and 2.
Assessment of resource intensity
As a benchmark, the resource intensities of the two most
important materials of the built environment—concrete
and steel—which would be needed to build the physical
storage infrastructure are taken as an estimate for the
additional emissions generated by GCS. As these
Fig. 2 Carbon surcharge for small-scale storage depending on lifetime and storage time
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materials carry embodied emissions, their usage by GCS
would be the source of additional global warming. To
reach a target surcharge cs, certain investments in mate-
rials have to be undertaken. As an upper estimate, we
assume that the world market cost of concrete and steel
would be the basis of the expenditures necessary to raise
the effective carbon price. As cost values, we assume:
○ Steel: cs = 500 €/t
○ Concrete: cco = 43.5 €/t
From the ecoinvent database [28], we take global
warming potentials (including pre-chain emissions) per
ton of material GWPx, with the following values:
○ Steel: GWPs = 2.172 tCO2eq/t
○ Concrete: GWPco = 0.099 tCO2eq/t
The additional emissions e can thus simply be derived
from the targeted surcharge, the specific expenditure per
ton of material x and the specific impact as:
ex ¼ cscx GWPx ð3Þ
In addition, the following specifications were assumed for
the estimation of material requirements and land use of
standard goods wagons according to [23]: Oil and gas: 95
m3 volume, ~ 16m length, 17.6 t dead weight. Solid mate-
rials: 82 m3 volume, ~ 16m length, 18.3 t dead weight.
Results
We first analyse the results for large-scale storage, which
we classify into natural and artificial. Natural large-scale
storage includes all options where natural boundaries
confine the mined material, whereas artificial storage re-
fers to engineering constructions. With the estimates
ccoal ≈ climestone ≈ 1 €/t for open pit storage, coil = 1.1 €/t
for underground oil storage in salt caverns, 10 €/t < cgas <
35 €/t for underground gas storage in salt caverns and 5
€/t < cgas < 18 €/t for underground gas storage in depleted
gas reservoirs, we arrive at surcharges (per ton of CO2) in
the range between csx = 0.1 €/t and csx = 2 €/t. This is sig-
nificantly smaller than the mentioned benchmark. It
should also be noted that, for reasons of energy security,
large-scale oil storage infrastructures have already been
built in recent decades with low price effects.
Figure 3 (left) shows the carbon surcharge for artificial
large-scale storage. In order to take into account future
economic uncertainties, we plot the GCS for interest
rates ranging from i = 0% to i = 10%. The figure demon-
strates that the carbon surcharge is a linearly increasing
function of the storage time whose slope is inversely
proportional to the carbon ratio αx defined in the
‘Methods: model and data’ section. Since αlimestone is
significantly lower than that of the other materials, the
carbon surcharge for limestone has a higher slope and is
therefore better suited for GCS. Nevertheless, Fig. 3 (left)
shows that all surcharges, except for limestone at high
interest rate, remain below 75 €/t as long as the storage
time is less than 2 years. Although we have neglected
operating costs, which may generate higher values of the
Fig. 3 Carbon surcharge for coal, oil, gas and limestone for different storage options as a function of the storage time. left: Storage in large-scale
enclosed coal and limestone bunkers with ccoal = climestone = 200 €/t, in large steel storage tanks for oil with coil = 300 €/t and in gas tank farms with
pipe containers (70 bar storage pressure) with cgas = 550 €/t. right: Storage in small-scale storages (incl. container, wagon and tracks) with ccoal =
climestone = 2200 €/t, coil = 1900 €/t and cgas = 8900 €/t. Lines are for interest rates i = 0% (lower line), i = 5% (middle line) to i = 10% (upper line) and
for a lifetime of the storage infrastructure of n = 10 years. The area between i = 0% and i = 10% is shaded to guide the eye.
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surcharge, we conclude that artificial large-scale storage
is unlikely to be a feasible basis for GCS.
We next analyse a modified concept, referred to as
small-scale storage. Here, we assume that the flow of all
four carbon-carrying raw materials is discretized into stan-
dardized small portions that are easy to track. More spe-
cifically, we assume that after mining, the materials are
filled into standard intermodal containers which are
mounted on railway cars. As shown in the conceptual
view in Fig. 4, the cars can be driven to the storage site
and kept there for the required time. If the upper sides of
the containers are equipped with a digital identifier in the
form of a barcode or a QR code, the identity and
position of the car can be tracked from space (see
e.g., [29]) or by future high-altitude platforms [30].
The computed surcharge for small-scale storage is
shown in Fig. 3 (right). The figure reveals that the
higher investment costs for railway cars and con-
tainers as compared to the large-scale storage options
translate directly into a higher slope of csx versus
storage time. This implies that small-scale storage is
suited to provide a surcharge in the range of 75 €/t.
Table 1 gives an overview of csx for both large-scale
and small-scale storage options. For a storage time of 1
year, all small-scale storage options lead to a surcharge
that is higher than 75 €/t. This indicates that small stor-
age units and long storage times are the key to high
values of csx. The last column of Table 1 shows the stor-
age time necessary to obtain csx = 75 €/t. The figures in-
dicate that for the small-scale storage case, the required
storage time is less than 1 year for all materials
considered.
Fig. 4 Visualization of global carbon surcharge by small-scale oil storage. Conceptual representation of the storage of oil in the vicinity of an oil
well using containers and railway cars
Table 1 Carbon surcharge for large-scale and small-scale storage options. For a given specific investment cost cx and carbon ratio
αx. csx is the carbon surcharge under the assumption of a storage time of 1 year. nx is the storage time required for the carbon
surcharge to be equal to 75 €/tCO2 (n = 10 years and i = 5% is assumed throughout)
cx [€/tx] αx [tCO2/tx] csx [€/tCO2] at nx = 1 year nx[months] at csx = 75 €/tCO2
Coal—large scale 200 2.50 10.4 87
Limestone—large scale 200 0.44 58.9 15
Oil—large scale 300 3.21 12.1 74
Gas—large scale 550 2.98 23.9 38
Coal—small scale 2200 2.50 114 7.9
Limestone—small scale 2200 0.44 648 1.4
Oil—small scale 1900 3.21 77 11.7
Gas—small scale 8900 2.98 387 2.3
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Discussion
We now briefly discuss the limitations of the presented
model as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
GCS over traditional methods for climate change
mitigation.
As GCS is a conceptual thought experiment, its
realization is elaborated only theoretically. In order to
keep our model simple, we have neglected two aspects.
First, we have confined our attention to the direct in-
vestment costs for the storage infrastructure because
they can be described by a simple universal scaling law.
We have neglected indirect investment costs (e.g., mea-
sures necessary for compliance with environmental regu-
lations or other legislation) as well as operating costs.
We have also ignored the risks of cost overruns [31] that
are characteristic of large-scale construction projects.
Taking into account these costs would increase csx sig-
nificantly. Second, we assumed in our model that the
lifetime n and the storage time nx are given parameters.
As a consequence, the surcharge would drop after n
years because the investment costs have been recovered,
but further costs may arise from maintenance and re-
placement after the lifetime of the storage facility. In the
event that the storages are provided by leasing compan-
ies, additional costs may be incurred for logistics ser-
vices. If GCS were to be implemented globally, nx would
have to be increased continuously so as to enforce a
continuous expansion of the storage capacity and to
make csx a monotonically increasing function of time.
Moreover, the parameters nx would have to be set in
such a way that the surcharge per ton of CO2 is identical
for all four materials.
Potential advantages of GCS are its impact across all
economic sectors, no need for tax collection, the absence
of tax revenues in countries with weak governance, the
opportunity to publicly trace and verify the carbon stor-
age using remote sensing and the possibility to organize
GCS as a global agreement between citizens and firms
with little or no governmental involvement.
Potential disadvantages of GCS are the high financial
and resource expenditures for the theoretically drafted
storage infrastructure, the non-uniformity of the storage
cost due to differences in the material and labour cost be-
tween different countries, possible ecological damage,
safety risks and land use, and large revenues for certain
sectors like the construction and steel industries. The em-
bodied emissions of the materials of the storage infrastruc-
ture (mainly steel and concrete) would be an additional
source of GHG emission. We estimate that the expend-
iture on steel and concrete necessary to raise the effective
carbon price would at maximum generate additional emis-
sions between 0.14 and 0.31 t of CO2-equivalent per ton
of priced carbon for a surcharge of 75 €/t, which would
conversely reduce the available budget of remaining
emissions. The use of infrastructure would be consider-
able in the case of small-scale storage. If we assume stand-
ard goods wagons more than 150 million units would be
required to store the four considered commodities accord-
ing to the assumed required storage time nx shown in
Table 1. The material requirements for the goods wagons
are estimated at more than 2.7 billion metric tons (mainly
steel, i.e. 1.7 times annual world steel production) and the
land use at about 6500 km2, which is about 1% of the size
of France. Assuming today’s specific emissions of 1.83 t of
CO2 per ton of steel [32], the GCS approach would, in the
worst-case scenario, cause an additional output from steel
production equivalent to 12–15% of today’s global CO2
emissions.
Finally, we wish to discuss our concept from a broader
perspective. The artistic view expressed in Fig. 4 must
not be taken literally. Nevertheless, it illustrates three
key properties of GCS, namely the discretization of the
global carbon stream into small parcels, the traceability
of each individual parcel, e.g. from space, and the possi-
bility to apply a controlled resistance to the mining of
carbon-carrying materials.
We shall now explain how these features can be en-
hanced and improved by cryptographic tools. We have
already pointed out that each container could be
equipped with a QR code that allows satellites to trace
them from space. In order to avoid any residual possibil-
ity of fraud, each container of coal could be additionally
registered in a blockchain [4, 33]. The data in the block-
chain can be accessed by anyone through the Internet,
and hence, each container can be traced by the general
public from the instant of mining to its injection into
the coal market. Blockchain technology could also be
used to connect mining information to sensors embed-
ded in the railway cars and in the mined materials,
thereby improving traceability. Thus, digitalization and
blockchain would transform the anthropogenic carbon
cycle from an anarchic system into a transparent and
well-documented one.
We finally demonstrate how the physical ‘resistance’ to
the mining of carbon-carrying materials embodied in the
vast array of railway cars can be enhanced by a virtual re-
sistance. This can be accomplished by coupling the min-
ing of coal, oil, gas and limestone to the creation of
cryptocurrency. The generation of fresh cryptocurrency
[34] is a computationally expensive process which is re-
ferred to as mining in the same way as this term is applied
to raw materials. Cryptocurrencies can be designed in
such a way that the number of cryptocoins is limited and
the computational cost (expressed by the number of bin-
ary operations) for each coin increases in a predefined way
as the maximum number of coins is approached. Since
the computational cost of mining cryptocurrency is dir-
ectly connected to the cost of computers and electricity,
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the mining process is equivalent to a financial penalty if
coupled to the mining of raw materials.
Assuming that we introduce a new cryptocurrency,
tentatively called ‘Carboncoin’, we could use it to in-
crease the cost of GCS as follows. We require that the
mining of each unit of coal, oil, gas and limestone must
be accompanied by the mining of one Carboncoin. The
exact amount of Carboncoins per ton of raw material
could be defined in such a way that one Carboncoin cor-
responds to the amount of raw material that would emit
1 t of CO2 after combustion. We now assume that the
Carboncoin-currency is designed in such a way that its
number is limited.
It was reported recently [7, 35] that humanity is left with
approximately 600 billion tons of CO2 to emit if global
warming is to be kept below 2 °C. Coupling the mining of
raw material to a mandatory mining of Carboncoins would
tie the remaining emissions of CO2 to the Carboncoins
whose number is limited to a maximum of 600 billion
units by the design of a mining algorithm. Under such a
scheme, our carbon credit would be automatically limited by
the laws of cryptography. The finite amount of cryptocur-
rency and the high computational power necessary for its
mining would increase the GCS far beyond the values listed
in Table 1. It is important to note that the current crypto-
currency mining method (‘Proof of Work’) is criticized for
its extensive energy consumption and carbon footprint, see
e.g. [36]. However, blockchains do not necessarily need to
be based on this algorithm. Less energy-consuming consen-
sus algorithms, such as ‘Proof of Stake’, could potentially
avert an ever-increasing energy demand.
To set the speed of the decarbonization of the global
energy system, the mining algorithm for Carboncoins
would have to be designed in such a way that the com-
putational cost increases with time so as to limit the an-
thropogenic emission or carbon dioxide according to the
requirements of the corresponding decarbonization sce-
nario. This parameter would have to be set by inter-
national agreements.
It should be noted that our concept of Carboncoins is
fundamentally different from that of the Climatecoins
recently proposed for emission trading. Our Carboncoin
serves no other purpose than to provide a reliable evi-
dence of the extraction of a limited amount of carbon-
carrying material. It should also be emphasized that this
concept is easier to verify than climate compensation
measures.
Finally, we should discuss some fundamental uncer-
tainties in the implementation of the GCS approach. On
the one hand, this concerns the role of producers, who
will have to lose most of their business volume in the
long term as a consequence of climate targets. GCS
could provide financial incentives for producers to adapt
and pivot their business cases with the retention of fuels
and by participating in the emerging infrastructure busi-
ness. Given the remaining 600 billion tons of CO2 to
emit and a targeted GCS of at least 75 €/tCO2, an annual
financial volume on the order of 1500 billion € can be
anticipated on average for the period up to 2050. At the
same time, there must also be mechanisms that ensure
that a high enough effective carbon price is reached
quickly to not exceed the carbon budget, especially at
the beginning of the introduction of GCS. This seems
necessary because the price elasticity of fossil resource
use is unclear in view of existing path dependencies, and
the instrument must not lead to a further delay in strin-
gent and effective climate protection. With increasing
costs for fossil resources, possibilities will be sought to
circumvent the regulations. Therefore, a superior inde-
pendent organization would have to evaluate and moni-
tor the mechanisms and their effectiveness.
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a mandatory on-site storage of
carbon-carrying raw materials could in principle achieve a
high cost effect, even if there are many question marks about
economic and ecological impacts and the concrete feasibility.
Such a mechanism therefore has the potential to add an ef-
fective surcharge on all subsequent products, covering all
sectors of the world economy. Thus, it can increase the ef-
fective price of carbon in a similar way as a global carbon
tax. However, it encloses the opportunity to trace and verify
the cost drivers and the possibility to be organized as a global
agreement between citizens and firms. The calculations re-
veal that only small-scale storage with large material and in-
frastructural needs is suited to provide a surcharge in the
range of 75 €/t that is believed to be necessary for effective
decarbonization. Compulsory storage can in principle be
coupled with blockchain-based smart contracts and a
mandatory mining of cryptocurrency.
We have introduced GCS as an exemplary thought ex-
periment focusing on how far investment costs translate
into surcharges on the raw materials. Aspects of a prac-
tical implementation, verification of effectiveness and
economic and ecological implications need further ana-
lysis but are beyond the scope of the present paper.
Abbreviations
CaCO3: Calcium carbonate; CNG: Compressed natural gas; CO2: Carbon
dioxide; GCS: Global carbon surcharge; GHG: Greenhouse gases; GWP: Global
warming potential
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Richard Bamler and Stefan Dech for insightful
discussions about satellite imaging.
Authors’ contributions
AT conceived the concept and formulated the model. MK, KN and TP
collected the data and carried out the computations. All authors discussed
the results. AT wrote the paper, and all coauthors commented the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Thess et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society            (2020) 10:9 Page 8 of 9
Funding
None.
Availability of data and materials
All data used and generated during this study are cited respectively and are
included in this published article. The detailed dataset calculated and used
for the presentation of the results is available from the corresponding author
on reasonable request.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 8 February 2019 Accepted: 19 January 2020
References
1. UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(2015) Adoption of the Paris. Agreement. Report No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.
1. [Internet]. Available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/
l09r01.pdf
2. IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) Climate Change
2014. Mitigation of climate change. Working Group III contribution to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[Internet]. Available: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
3. Stiglitz JE, Stern N, Duan M, Edenhofer O, Giraud G, Heal G, et al (2017)
Report of the high-level commission on carbon prices. [Internet]. Available:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54ff9c5ce4b0a53decccfb4c/t/59244
eed17bffc0ac256cf16/1495551740633/CarbonPricing_Final_May29.pdf
4. Chapron G (2017) The environment needs cryptogovernance. Nature. 545:
403–403
5. Narayanan A, Bonneau J, Felten E, Miller A, Goldfeder S (2016) Bitcoin and
cryptocurrency technologies: A comprehensive introduction. Princeton
University Press.
6. Schellnhuber HJ, Cramer WP, editors (2006) Avoiding dangerous climate
change. Cambridge University Press.
7. Rockström J, Gaffney O, Rogelj J, Meinshausen M, Nakicenovic N,
Schellnhuber HJ (2017) A roadmap for rapid decarbonization. Science.
355(6331):1269–1271
8. United Nations (2017) Reference: C.N.464.2017.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d” (PDF).
Depositary Notification. [Internet]. Available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/CN/2017/CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf
9. Shear MD (2017) Trump will withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement.
The New York Times. 2017 June 1. [Internet]. Available: https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html
10. Cline WR (1992) The economics of global warming. Institute for
International Economics. ISBN: 9780881321326.
11. Aldy J, Stavins R (2012) The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon:
Theory and Experience. J Environ Dev 21(2):152–180
12. Spreng CP, Sovacool BK, Spreng D (2016) All hands on deck: polycentric
governance for climate change insurance. Clim Chang 139:129 https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10584-016-1777-z
13. Nordhaus W (2015) Climate clubs: overcoming free-riding in international
climate policy. Am Econ Rev 105(4):1339–1370 https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.
15000001
14. UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data. [Internet]. 2014. Available: http://unfccc.int/
ghg_data/items/3800.php
15. Stern N (2007) The economics of climate change: The Stern Review.
Cambridge University Press
16. Anthoff D, Tol RSJ (2013) The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon: a
decomposition analysis using FUND. Clim Chang 117:515–530
17. Emission Factor Database EFDB. IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. [Internet]. 2006 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/EFDB/main.php
18. The role of gas storage in internal market and in ensuring security of supply.
EC – European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy. EUR 2015.1391.
[Internet]. 2015 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
sites/ener/files/documents/REPORT-Gas%20Storage-20150728.pdf
19. Current state of and issues concerning underground natural gas storage.
Staff report. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). [Internet]. 2004
September 30 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available:https://www.ferc.gov/
EventCalendar/Files/20041020081349-final-gs-report
20. Facts and figures about the power plant. Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen.
[Internet]. 2015 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: http://www.trianel-luenen.de
21. Government of Gujarat. Establishment of tank farms at PCPIR, Dahej.
[Internet]. 2017 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: https://vibrantgujarat.com/
writereaddata/images/pdf/project-profiles/Tank-Farms-at-PCPIR-Dahej.pdf
22. Proven returns for tank farms and terminals. Siemens. [Internet]. 2017 [cited
2018 March 29]. Available: http://w3.siemens.com/markets/global/en/oil-gas/
PublishingImages/applications/storage/ Brochure-tank-farm-EN.pdf
23. Güterwagenkatalog Gattung H. DBCargo. [Internet]. 2017 [cited 2018 March 29].
Available: https://gueterwagenkatalog.dbcargo.com/de/gueterwagenkatalog/detail/
detail/bauart/cd9ec92ef78e9af8ac386286ad941528-/
24. Wagon manufacturing. VTG Waggonbau Graaff. [Internet]. 2016 [cited 2018
March 29]. Available: https://www.waggonbau-graaff.com/
25. On the road – by rail – inter-modal traffic. Feldbinder Spezialfahrzeugwerke.
[Internet]. 2017 [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: http://www.feldbinder.com/
en/vehicles__265/
26. Equipment. Seaco. [Internet] [cited 2018 March 29]. Available: http://www.
seacoglobal.com/equipment/
27. Technology containers from CARU containers. Caru-Tech. [Internet]. 2017
[cited 2018 March 29]. Available: https://www.caru-tech.com/
28. Frischknecht R, Jungbluth N, Althaus H-J, Doka G, Dones R, Heck T et al
(2005) The ecoinvent database: Overview and methodological framework.
Int J Life Cycle Assess 10(1):3–9
29. DigitalGlobe. worldview4. [Internet] 2017. Available: http://worldview4.
digitalglobe.com
30. Tozer TC, Grace D (2008) High-altitude platforms for wireless communications.
Electronics & Communication Engineering Journal 13(3):127–137
31. Flyvbjerg B, Bruzelius N, Rothengatter W. Megaprojects and risk: An
anatomy of ambition. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
32. World Steel Association. Steel’s contribution to a low carbon future and climate
resilient societies - worldsteel position paper. ISBN 978-2-930069-83-8, 2019.
33. Andoni M et al. Blockchain technology in the energy sector: A systematic
review of challenges and opportunities. Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, Volume 100, February 2019, 143-174.
34. Nakamoto S. Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. [Internet]. 2008.
Available: www.bitcoin.org
35. Figueres N, Schellnhuber HJ, Whiteman G, Rockström J, Hobley A, Rahmstorf
S (2017) Three years to safeguard our climate. Nature. 546:593–595
36. Stoll C, Klaaßen L, Gallersdörfer U (2019) The Carbon Footprint of Bitcoin.
Joule 3:1–15 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2019.05.012
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Thess et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society            (2020) 10:9 Page 9 of 9
